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Abstract
This paper studies an R&D outsourcing contract between a ﬁrm and a contrac-
tor, considering the possibility that in the interim stage, the contractor might sell
the innovation to the rival ﬁrm. Our result points out that due to the competition
in the interim stage, the reward needed to prevent leakage will be pushed up to the
extent that a proﬁtable leakage free contract does not exist. This result will also
apply to cases considering revenue-sharing schemes and a disclosure punishment for
commercial theft. Then, we demonstrate that in a competitive mechanism where the
R&D ﬁrm hires two contractors together with a relative performance scheme, the dis-
closure punishment might help and there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
where the probability of information leakage is lower and the equilibrium reward is
also cheaper than hiring one contractor.
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Outsourcing has become an important business strategy in a global economy (see e.g.,
Grossman and Helpman, 2005). Firms subcontract a wide range of activities, ranging from
product design to assembly, from research and development to marketing, distribution and
after-sales service. Among the various reasons1, "cost reduction" has been considered the
main driving factor for outsourcing. In particular, R&D outsourcing can reduce time and
money expenditures, free up resources for other endeavors and reduce technical uncertainty.
McKinsey & Company (2003) reported that the reduction of labour costs results in savings
of at least 45—55%. Every dollar of labour cost moved oﬀshore creates US$ 1.45—1.47
globally, US$ 1.12—1.14 to the USA, and 33 cents to the hosting country. They concluded
that R&D outsourcing is a "win—win" proposition for both companies and workers overseas.
However, since R&D activities are linked directly to a company’s core secrets concern-
ing new technology or new product, protection of intellectual property has been the most
crucial issue in R&D outsourcing (Balachandra, 2005). Although governments2 in the out-
sourcing countries have been taking steps and enacting laws to assure ﬁrms that intellectual
property is protected, eﬀective enforcement of laws requires that the owner of this infor-
mation must have taken reasonable measures to safeguard it from unauthorized disclosure.
Writing a non-disclosure agreement or contract will be the ﬁrst step for protecting intel-
lectual property. Hence, there has been a growing interest on R&D outsourcing contracts
with particular focus on information disclosure or leakage (see e.g. Baccara, 2007; Lai, et.
al., 2006; Qiu, 2006). In this paper, we will follow this line of research, and study an R&D
outsourcing contract considering the possibility that the contractor might deliberately3 sell
1Deavers (1997) pointed out 5 reasons for outsourcing, including to improve company focus, to access to
world-class capabilities, to accelerate beneﬁts from reengineering, to share risks and to have free resources
for other purposes.
2India passed the IP law in February 2005 giving greater protection for IP. This has encouraged many
pharmaceutical ﬁrms to outsource their drug development activities (Balachandra, 2005).
3Other forms of information leakage include leakage through publicly observable variables like prices
1the innovation to the rivals. We will present the problem caused by deliberate information
leakage, and propose a leakage free mechanism for the R&D ﬁrm.
The ﬁrst step to modelling R&D contract is to identify the key diﬀerence between
R&D activities and the others. According to Reinganum (1989), innovation is featured
by its uncertainty in both the timing and probability of success. This indicates that
R&D activities are normally time consuming and involve a high risk of failure. Moreover,
due to the uncertainty of innovation, the contractor will become better informed of the
status of R&D activities, and this gives the contractor an opportunity to manipulate the
information; that is, the contractor can possibly sell the innovation to the rivals without
being detected4. The closest literature to this process of information leakage is that on
contract renegotiation (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990) or collusion (e.g., Tirole, 1986).
The contract renegotiation literature addresses the possibility that the contractor might
propose to renegotiate the deals of contract in the interim stage; The collusion literature
addresses the situation where the contractor might collude with the monitor in a multiple-
layer hierarchy environment (see more discussion in 1.1). The major diﬀerence5 of our
setting is: the leakage problem is actually a form of renegotiation or collusion, but it is
with the rival of the R&D ﬁrm. Proposing to sell the information to the rival will create
a price competition between the original contract reward and the new oﬀer by the rival;
The rival ﬁrm will outbid the original reward as long as there is beneﬁtf o r mh a v i n gt h e
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Brunnermeier, 2005); actions (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, et. al. 1992);
collaboration (Jaﬀe, 1986; Perez-Castillo and Sandonis, 1996); contracting process (Martimort, et. al.,
2007).
4The R&D ﬁrm cannot detect the betrayal because it is not certain whether the innovation has been
successful.
5The information leakage problem can be explained as a special case of renegotiation or collusion, but
we will demonstrate that the usual solution of renegotiation proof or collusion proof contract cannot solve
the leakage problem. Since this kind of betrayal behaviors ﬁti nm a n yo t h e rﬁelds, e.g., a client ﬁrm might
bribe the auditor to misreport the ﬁnancial status, this paper hopes to contribute to seeking remedies for
this sort of problems.
2innovation, and this will push up the level of original reward needed to prevent the rival
from making a successful oﬀer. As a consequence, the R&D ﬁrm needs to pay a reward that
is at least higher than its own beneﬁt form the innovation, to prevent successful leakage.
In other words, a leakage free6 R&D contract does not exist in a symmetric7 setting.
T h er e a s o nf o rt h en o n e x i s t e n c eo fal e a k a g ef r e ec o n t r a c ti sb e c a u s ei nad i r e c tm e c h a -
nism, the contractor is implicitly given more bargaining power (i.e., by selling the innova-
tion without being detected). Both the R&D ﬁrm and the rival will compete for the only
contractor’s loyalty, so the reward is pushed up due to competition. If some competition
can be introduced to the contractor side, then the R&D ﬁrm’s bargaining power will be
increased and it will not necessarily pay the contractor the highest beneﬁt in order to pre-
vent leakage. However, according to Holmstrom (1982), "forcing agents to compete with
each other is valueless if there is no common underlying uncertainty", and the keypoint
for information extraction is to "create information systems that separate out individual
contributions". Hence, in the second part of this paper, we will demonstrate how a com-
petitive mechanism, where the R&D ﬁrm hires two contractors and introduces a relative
performance regime, can overcome the over rewarding problem from information leakage.
Overall, we will study an R&D outsourcing contract between a ﬁrm and a contractor,
considering the possibility that in the interim stage, the contractor might sell the innovation
to the rival ﬁrm. Our result points out that due to the competition in the interim stage, a
proﬁtable leakage free contract does not exist. This result will apply to cases considering
revenue-sharing schemes (Lai, et. al., 2006) and disclosure punishments for commercial
theft (see e. g., Section 1832 of the Economic Espionage Act). Then, we demonstrate
that in a competitive mechanism where the R&D ﬁrm hires two contractors together with
a relative performance scheme, the disclosure punishment might help and there exists a
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the probability of information leakage is lower
6We will demonstrate in Section 2 that it is without loss of generality to focus on a leakage free contract.
7Here, ﬁrms are assumed to be symmetric in the output market. However, we will discuss the eﬀect of
an asymmetric assumption.
3and the equilibrium reward is also cheaper than hiring one contractor.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is related to three lines of research: R&D outsourcing contracts, contracting
with collusion, and contracting with multiple agents. The ﬁrst line of research deals with
the same topic as our paper but uses a diﬀerent model setup; the second line uses a
similar model setup but we will point out the diﬀerence from our model and discuss the
consequence from such a diﬀerence; the third addresses the beneﬁt from hiring multiple
agents, as we will suggest in Section 3.
Firstly, although there have been many theoretical discussions on the eﬀects of R&D
activities and innovation imitation in an open or closed economy (see e.g., Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom, 2006, for recent literature), only a few of them address particularly on R&D
outsourcing contracts (see Baccara, 2007; Lai, et. al., 2006; Qiu, 2006). Following the
pioneering outsourcing paper by Grossman and Helpman (2005), all these papers analyze
ﬁrms’ in-house/outsourcing decisions in a general equilibrium framework. This is diﬀerent
from our partial analysis setting, and we provide the reasoning as follows. The advantage
for using a general equilibrium framework is the convenience to understand the overall ef-
fect of R&D outsourcing. However, since the economy system is so complicated, the model
needs to make some simpliﬁcations to let the model tractable, but these simpliﬁcations
can sometimes omit critical features of R&D outsourcing. For example, Lai, et. al. (2006)
consider the leakage problem by assuming that leakage will reduce the R&D ﬁrm’s market
share, but with symmetric information, it is diﬃcult to describe in more details how the
information is leaked to the rival ﬁrm. Moreover, due to the assumption of perfect informa-
tion, it is possible to ﬁnd a subgame perfect equilibrium (e.g., Baccara, 2007, p. 13) where
the leakage problem can be prevented by precommitting to a reward that the contractor
do not sell the innovation. Such a reward, as we will demonstrate, does not exist in an
asymmetric information contract.
4In sum, our paper follows most contract literature in considering a partial analysis
framework. Apart from the diﬀerence in information structure, there are some similarities
between our paper and the existing works. Baccara (2007) considers the situation where
a consultant unit might sell the secret of a client ﬁrm to its rivals. Baccara concludes that
the contractor will be the information monopolist that appropriates all the surplus of the
market for information, and there exists a leakage proof contract in a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Likewise, we also demonstrate that in a direct mechanism, the contractor will
appropriate most beneﬁt, and the reason is because the direct mechanism has implicitly
given more bargaining power to the contractor. However, we will demonstrate that a
leakage free contract does not exist with one contractor and asymmetric information. Lai
et. al. (2006) emphasize how the choice of rewarding scheme (i.e., ﬁxed or revenue sharing)
will aﬀect the contractor’s leakage decision. Our paper, diﬀerently, demonstrates that the
leakage problem under asymmetric information cannot be prevented by either ﬁxed or
revenue sharing scheme. The reason is because the incentive for cheating is the same under
both schemes, and hence the over rewarding problem still exists with the revenue sharing
scheme. The form of rewarding schemes make no diﬀerence to the result. Qiu (2006)
studies ﬁrms’ in-house/outsourcing decisions by considering diﬀerent degrees of contract
enforcement, which corresponds to the power of copyright protection. Qiu concludes that
when copyright protection is weak, only customized software will be developed; when
copyright protection is strong, both customized software and packaged software will be
developed. Our paper is related to Qiu’s model in addressing the eﬀect of a pecuniary
punishment for information leakage. However, with the same reasoning of bargaining
power and innovation uncertainty as described above, the device of a pecuniary punishment
cannot prevent the leakage problem in a single contractor case. We will demonstrate that
this device might work in a competitive mechanism in Section 3.
Similar to our partial analysis setting, Martimort et. al. (2007) consider innovation
contracts between an inventor and a developer, when the developer can possibly steal the
5idea form the privately informed inventor. Our setting is diﬀerent in that, the contractor is
to reveal its private information to a third party (i.e., the rival ﬁrm), and this third party’s
opposite preference (to the R&D ﬁr m )i st h ed r i v i n gf o r c ef o rt he nonexistence of a leakage
free contract.
Secondly, our model setup is similar to the theory of contract with collusion (pioneering
by Tirole, 1986). This line of research8 considers contracting in a multiple-layer hierarchy
environment, e.g., the government, a monitor and a regulated ﬁrm, where the monitor
and the regulated ﬁrm might collude and take action against the government. The main
diﬀerence of our model is that the leakage problem is actually a form of collusion with the
rival of the R&D ﬁrm. Since the rival ﬁrm has incentive to compete with the R&D ﬁrm
by means of making counter oﬀers, a collusion proof contract does not exist in our model.
However, it is worthwhile to discuss whether it is without loss of generality to focus on a
collusion proof contract. We will demonstrate shortly that partial collusion (like partial
leakage in Baccara, 2007) cannot happen in equilibrium.
Finally, our main result asserts that when the R&D ﬁrm hires two contractors together
with a relative performance scheme, the leakage problem can be mitigated and the equi-
librium reward is also cheaper. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) consider whether to hire
one or two agents to investigate two causes. They conclude that competition between the
two agents will allow the organization either to obtain more information or to obtain the
information at a lower cost. The reason behind is: if only hiring one agent, there will be a
rent for the agent to put in the second eﬀort (for the second cause); but "with two agents, it
is easy to leave them no rents by giving each a positive wage only if he succeeds in moving
policy away from the status quo" (p. 14). Gromb and Martimort (2006) also consider the
alternatives of hiring one or two agents for two signals. Their model further considers the
cases where the two agents might horizontally collude or one agent might vertically collude
8See Baiman et al. (1991), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), Kofman and Lawarree (1996) and Khalil and
Lawarree (2006) for discussion on auditing theory.
6with the principal. Our model is diﬀerent in addressing that leakage is collusion with an
outside party of an opposite preference. Moreover, a competitive mechanism is cheaper
in our model because with two contractors, there is more chance that a betrayer can be
identiﬁed and receive the disclosure punishment ( see Section 3 for details).
The organization for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the envi-
ronment of a duopoly market with two identical ﬁrms. One of the two ﬁr m sd e c i d e st o
engage in R&D outsourcing before production. We will explain the leakage problem in the
contracting process, and demonstrate the nonexistence of a leakage free contract. Section 3
presents the competitive mechanism and characterizes a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
where both the chance of information leakage and the equilibrium reward are lower than
hiring one contractor. The last section contains the concluding remarks.
2T h e M o d e l
This section describes a duopoly market with two ﬁrms: ﬁrm 1 and 2. Before production,
ﬁrm 1 decides to engage in R&D outsourcing on a process innovation with an external con-
tractor or research unit. To focus on the information leakage problem and looking for a so-
lution for this problem, we will eschew the discussion on R&D ﬁrm’s in-house/outsourcing9
decision, by assuming directly that ﬁrm 1 will undertake the R&D outsourcing. Also, we as-
sume only one R&D ﬁrm to avoid the strategic correlation10 problem in a common11agency
model.
The Environment We will consider a production market with two ﬁrms, each pro-
ducing a homogenous product denoted by qi,i=1 ,2. The market demand is described
9The interested readers are referred to Lai et. al. (2006) and Baccara (2007).
10Also, we will not discuss the case with imperfect commitment (see e.g. Bester and Strausz, 2006).
11The information leakage problem can be presented well in the framework with one R&D ﬁrm. With
multiple R&D ﬁrms, there will be strategic correlation associated with multiple principals framework. We
refer to Martimort (2006) for thorough literature on this line of research.
7by a downward sloping linear function, with a suﬃcient large scale: P = a − b(q1 + q2)
with 0 <q 1 + q2 <a .To simplify, it is assumed that before engaging in R&D activities,
all ﬁrms are equipped with the same production technology, which is described by a linear
production cost function: cqi with c>0.
Now assume that, before production, ﬁrm 1 decides to hire an external contractor
(denoted by 0) to perform a research on a cost reducing (i.e., process) innovation. The
innovation is uncertain and the probability of success will depend on the contractor’s
eﬀort in R&D. The details and further notations will be given shortly. If the innovation
is successful, the production cost will be reduced to b c (<c ). Hence, let ci denote ﬁrm
i’s production cost, and let πi(ci,c j) be ﬁrm i’s proﬁt associated with cost12 combination
(ci,c j) for i,j =1 ,2,a n d
πi(ci,c j) ≡ max
qi
[a − bq1 − bq2 − ci]qi. (1)
The calculation for equilibrium outputs is standard and hence will be omitted. The equilib-
rium outputs and proﬁts are qi = 1
3b(a−2ci+cj), and πi(ci,c j)= 1
9b(a-2ci+cj)2, respectively.
For ﬁrm 1 to engage in the R&D project in the ﬁrst place, we will assume13 that (c−b c) is
suﬃciently large. The following comparison on πi(ci,c j) is useful for further usage.
Remark 1 Let Esc2 and Enc2 be two arbitrary costs such that b c ≤ Esc2 <E nc2 <c .Then
we have π1(b c,Esc2) − π1(c,Enc2)]<[π2(c,b c) − π2(b c,c)].
Remark 1 is an immediate result form the symmetric setting. We will later demonstrate
that if the two ﬁrms are not symmetric, the following discussion on information leakage
will still apply, but whether there exists a proﬁtable leakage free contract will depend on
whether ﬁr m1h a sah i g h e rb e n e ﬁt from innovation. The contracting process is depicted
in Figure 1.
12Later we will explain that ﬁrm 2’s cost can possibly reduce to b c if information leakage happens.
13Otherwise, we need to discuss whether it is worthy to engage in an R&D activity for all possible ranges
of b c.
8Contract
Contractor knows    and 






Figure 1: The R&D outsourcing contract.
Timing We will assume that ﬁrm 1 oﬀers an R&D contract, denoted by C,t ot h e
contractor on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The contract contains rewards for diﬀerent results
of innovation, that is, C ≡ { (r),r∈ Θ} where  (r) is the end of contract reward for the
reported result r. Notice that this reported result can be diﬀerent from the true status (to
be deﬁned shortly) and the actual values of  (r) will be determined in the equilibrium.
If C is accepted by the contractor, then he needs to make a binary14 eﬀort decision
e ∈ E, with E = {0,e} which is unobservable to ﬁrm 1. The innovation is uncertain
and the probability of success will depend on the contractor’s eﬀort in R&D. That is,
denote the status15 of innovation by θ, with θ ∈ Θ = {s,n}.smeans that the innovation
is successful and the production cost will be reduced to b c (which is less that c), and n
means that the innovation is failed and hence the production cost remains c.L e t γ(s|e)
denote the probability of success and we will assume that γ(s|0) = 0 and γ(s|e) > 0. The
interpretation of this assumption is: if no eﬀort has been put in, then the probability16
for a successful innovation is zero; if the full eﬀort has been put in, there is still a chance
γ(n|e),w h i c hi se q u a lt o1−γ(s|e), that the R&D eﬀort is failed. Finally, putting in eﬀort
is costly and the cost is captured by an increasing function ψ(e), with ψ(0) <ψ (e), and
we assume that ψ(0) = 0.
14We have assumed discrete eﬀorts in order to emphasize the leakage problem. A continuous setting will
change the form of incentive compatibility rewards, but the leakage problem is still the same.
15This is an often used assumption in R&D or innovation literature (see. e.g., Reinganum, 1989).
16An alternative assumption is the Poisson distribution (see e.g., Reinganum, 1989).
9After knowing the status of innovation (dented as the interim stage) and if the state is
s, the contractor might consider to sell the innovation17 to the rival, ﬁrm 2, for a second
deal18.D e n o t eL as the oﬀer made by ﬁrm 2 to exchange for the innovation, and this again
will be determined in the equilibrium. Let I(L,θ) denote the contractor’s leakage decision
on whether to accept the oﬀer, depending on the size of ﬁrm 2’s oﬀer as well as the status
of truth. That is, if θ = n, then we will assume that the contractor cannot fabricate the
innovation and hence I(L,n)=0for all L. If θ = s and L is high enough, then I(L,s)=1
and he will sell19 the innovation to ﬁrm 2 and report to ﬁrm 1 that R&D has failed. If
θ = s but L is not suﬃciently high, then I(L,s)=0and the true status will be reported
to ﬁrm 1, whose production cost will be reduced to b c.
Notice that since the innovation is uncertain, the contractor is the only one who knows
the status of innovation. Firm 1 cannot distinguish the following three cases: (i) no eﬀort
has been put in; (ii) the eﬀort has failed; (iii) the innovation has been sold. So even though
that ﬁrm 1 might be suspective that there is such a deal going on, it cannot counteract ﬁrm
2 in this deal. However, anticipating information leakage to happen, ﬁrm 1 cannot just
pretend to be ignorant. A more realistic assumption will be for ﬁrm 1 to put in the clauses
of the contract a punishment for this kind of deliberate disclosure of commercial secrets.
The empirical support for this assumption is Section 1832 of the Economic Espionage Act
1996. Section 1832 makes the commercial theft of trade secrets a criminal act regardless
of who beneﬁts (foreigners or non-foreigners). A defendant convicted for theft of trade
secrets under Section 1832 can be imprisoned for up to 10 years and ﬁned $500,000 or
17Here we assume that the contractor has full control over the innovation, as this is the worst case for
the leakage problem. Baccara (2007) considers diﬀerent extents that the contractor can control the result.
18Notice that ﬁrm 2 cannot observe the contracting process. However, this is not critical in the case
with perfect commitment.
19Here we have simpliﬁed the setting by assuming that the contractor will not cheat on ﬁrm 2. Since
the cost reduction from innovation is veriﬁable, ﬁrm 2 can delay the payment L until it is certain that the
innovation can work.
10both. Corporations and other entities can be ﬁned no more than $5 million. To simplify,
we will assume20 a pecuniary punishment D for a convicted contractor. By "convicted",
we refer to the case where ﬁrm 1 is 100% certain that the innovation has been sold. We will
discuss the eﬀect of this punishment at the end of Section 2 and Section 3 in more details.
Finally, according to the contractor’s report, ﬁrm 1’s production cost is denoted by
c1(r), which is c for r = n and b c for r = s. However, due to the secret deal between
the informed contractor and ﬁrm 2, the production has become an incomplete information
game. That is, ﬁrm 2 of course knows whether it has successfully bought the innovation
and hence it knows c2 surely; that is, c2 = I(L,θ)b c +( 1− I(L,θ))c. Given θ = s,i fL is
accepted, then ﬁrm 2’s cost is b c; otherwise, its cost is c. Firm 1, on the other hand, needs
to guess ﬁrm 2’s cost depending on whether ﬁrm 1 believes that the contractor has been
cheating. Denote σ(r) as the probability that ﬁrm 1 thinks that ﬁrm 2 has cost b c,a n d
this belief will be derived shortly according21 to the Bayes’ rule. Then ﬁrm 1’s expectation
about ﬁr m2 ’ sc o s ti sd e n o t e db yErc2, which is given by σ(r)b c +( 1− σ(r))c.
Hence, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2’s realized proﬁts are given by
π1(c1(r),E rc2) −  (r) and π2(c1(r),c 2) − I(L,θ)L, (2)
for θ = s,n, respectively. The interpretations for two formulations are: Given a report r,
ﬁrm 1’s production cost will be c1(r) and it can rationally calculate the chance that the
innovation has been sold to ﬁrm 2 (i.e. σ(r)), and hence anticipate that ﬁrm 2’s production
cost to be Erc2.  (r) is the reward paid to the contractor for reporting r. On the other
hand, ﬁrm 2 knows for sure its production cost, which is either c or b c depending on whether
20Normally, lawsuits take a long time and there can be both pecuniary and non-pecuniary (i.e., in prison)
punishments. Since our model considers only two stages (i.e., the ﬁrst and the interim stages), we need to
make this simpliﬁcation for tractability.
21Due to innovation uncertainty, ﬁrm 1 cannot observe the contractor’s secret deal. However, as required
by sequential rationality (see Kreps and Wilson, 1982), ﬁrm 1 will rationally update its beliefs for oﬀ
equilibrium path reports.
11the contractor accepts its oﬀer of L at state θ. Finally, the contractor’s realized payoﬀ is
(1 − I(L,θ)) (s)+I(L,θ)( (n)+L) − ψ(e), for θ ∈ Θ, (3)
which consists of a reward for reporting r,ab e n e ﬁtf r o ms e l l i n gt h ei n n o v a t i o nL and the
eﬀort cost.
Overall, we consider a R&D contracting process with the possibility of information leak-
age. This setup ﬁts in most R&D outsourcing contracts in many areas such as pharmacy,
ICT, astronautic development, and even basic research in universities. The key feature of
R&D activities is that the contractor possess private information in the interim stage, and
this gives the contractor more bargaining power since it can cheat on the employing ﬁrm
without being identiﬁed. We will later show how this will aﬀect the information rent in the
leakage free contract. Notice that our concern is the deliberate information leakage that the
contractor sells the private information to the rival ﬁr mp u r p o s e l y .T h i si sd i ﬀerent from
other forms of information leakage, including leakage through publicly observable variables
like prices (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Brunnermeier, 2005); actions (Banerjee, 1992;
Bikhchandani, et. al. 1992), R&D collaboration (Jaﬀe, 1986; Perez-Castillo and Sandonis,
1996) or contracting process (Martimort, et. al., 2007).
Finally, there are some discussions about whether diﬀerent forms of reward, such as
revenue sharing scheme, can mitigate the contractor’s leakage motivation. It is expected
that, by sharing the revenue with the contractor, the R&D ﬁrm and the contractor will have
more similar preferences, and hence the motivation for information leakage can be reduced.
Lai, et. al. (2006) has analyzed the contractor’s leakage decision under diﬀerent levels of
revenue sharing. However, our model will demonstrate that revenue sharing scheme can
not be leakage free, either. The reason is because the incentive for cheating is still the same
as the ﬁxed revenue scheme, and hence the over rewarding problem still exists under the
revenue sharing scheme (more details later).
122.1 Leakage free Contract
We will follow the revelation principle (see Myerson, 1979) and concentrate on a direct
mechanism, where ﬁrm 1 designs an incentive compatible rewarding scheme, and the honest
and obedient contractor will report the status of innovation truthfully. Since the private
information actually emerges in the interim stage as the outcome of innovation, we will
follow the literature on contracts with renegotiation or collusion by seeking for a "leakage
free contract". Since the incentive scheme involves actions in the continuing production
game, we will solve backward the timing in Figure 1.
Firstly, recall that σ(r) is the probability that after receiving report r, ﬁrm 1 thinks
that the innovation is actually successful but the contractor has sold it to ﬁrm 2. We now
explain how this is derived by the Bayes’ rule. For r = s, ﬁrm 1 knows that θ = s,
and the contractor has put in full eﬀort and has not betrayed (i.e., I(L,s)=0 ) . Hence,
σ(s)=ργ(s|e)I(L,s),w h i c hi se q u a lt o0. On the other hand, for r = n, ﬁrm 1 cannot
distinguish the following three cases: (i) no eﬀort has been put in; (ii) the eﬀort has failed;
(iii) the innovation has been sold. So
σ(n)=
ργ(s|e)I(L,s)
ρ[γ(s|e)I(L,s)+( 1− γ(s|e))] + (1 − ρ)
, (4)
which is smaller than ρ. The denominator is the total probability for reporting n,a n dt h e
nominator denotes the chance for successful information leakage. Given this belief, the
equilibrium outputs under incomplete information22 are given by equation (1) and (2).
Leakage Decision The contractor’s leakage decision will depend on the type as well
as ﬁrm 2’s oﬀer. First, if θ = n, then since the contractor has nothing to oﬀer, I(L,n)=0
for all L.S e c o n d ,i fθ = s, it is assumed that the contractor only cares about pecuniary23
22An interesting query with this setting is: if ﬁrm 2 has b c, wouldn’t ﬁrm 1 infer that it has stolen the
innovation? Our answer is that: since ﬁrm 1 does not know about the true status for sure, it cannot prove
that the contractor has sold the innovation with one contractor.
23We have simpliﬁed the setup by ignoring the morality or ethic concern (see e.g., Howieson 2005) or
the reputation concern from the repeated game framework (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1982).
13revenue; that is, he will sell the innovation to ﬁrm 2 iﬀ L +  (n) ≥  (s), where  (n)
denotes the reward for reporting n (instead of s). That is, I(L,s)=1if24 L ≥  (s)− (n)
and I(L,s)=0for otherwise.
Firm 2’s decision is to decide whether to outbid ﬁrm 1’s reward and get the innovation.
Since the contractor will sell the innovation iﬀ L ≥  (s) −  (n), the minimum bid for
information leakage is L =  (s)− (n). Firm 2 will oﬀer the bid up to a maximal level L,
w h i c hi sd e t e r m i n e db yπ2(c1(n),b c) − L = π2(c1(s),c).T h a ti s ,L is the net beneﬁtt h a t
ﬁrm 2 can get from buying the innovation and changing the contractors’ report from s to
n. We can summarise ﬁrm 2’s decision as:
to oﬀer L =  (s) −  (n) if L ≤ L. (5)
For further usage, we will refer to the following situation as successful information leakage:
When θ = s, ﬁrm 2 oﬀers L ≤ L, the contractor accepts the oﬀer (i.e., I(L,s)=1 )a n d
changes the report form s to n.
Optimal Leakage Free Contract We will combine the discussion of the incentive
scheme and the contractor’s eﬀort decision. According to the revelation principle, we will
restrict to rewards that satisfy individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC)
constraints. Since the eﬀort choice is binary, there is no loss to concentrate on a full
eﬀort rewarding scheme. That is, denote Π0(e) as the contractor’s expected payoﬀ for an
arbitrary level of e,w h e r e
Π0(e)=ργ(s|e)[(1−I(L,s)) (s)+I(L,s)( (n)+L)]+[(ρ)(1−γ(s|e))+(1−ρ)] (n)−ψ(e).
The interpretation is: there will be a prior belief ρ that the innovation is successful, but
there is only a probability γ(e|s) that the contractor can discover a successful innovation.
Moreover, there still are two possibilities: (i) If the successful innovation is reported truth-
fully, then the contractor gets  (s); (ii) if the innovation is sold to ﬁrm 2, he will get
24Here we assume the usual breaking rule to ensue the existence of equilibrium.
14( (n)+L). Finally, there will be a total probability of [(ρ)(1−γ(s|e))+(1−ρ)] that the
innovation is failed. Notice that Π0(0) =  (n).
The IR and IC constraints are given by
Π0(e) ≥ 0, (IR)
Π0(e) ≥  (n). (IC)
If we can restrict to non-negative rewards, then IC will imply IR. We will ignore the IR
constraint henceforth. In addition, to prevent successful information leakage, an extra
”leakage free” constraint is also required, i.e.,
 (s) −  (n) ≥ π2(c1(n),b c) − π2(c1(s),c). (Leakage Free)
This constraint requires the diﬀerence of the two rewards be at least higher than the
maximal oﬀer that ﬁrm 2 can make.
Let Π1(e,C) denote ﬁrm 1’s expected payoﬀ for committing to contract C, which is
given by
Π1(e,C)=ργ(s|e)(1 − I(L,s))[π1(c1(s),E sc2) −  (s)]
+[ργ(s|e)I(L,s)+( ρ)(1 − γ(s|e)) + (1 − ρ)][π1(c1(n),E nc2) −  (n)].
The ﬁrst part of the expected payoﬀ says that there is a total probability ργ(s|e)(1 −
I(L,s)) that the contractor discovers a successful innovation and does not sell it to ﬁrm
2. In this case, ﬁrm 1 will receive a report s,r e s u l t i n gi nt h ec o s tc1(s), and have an
expectation about ﬁrm 2’s cost Esc2. The second part says that there is a total probability
[ργ(s|e)I(L,s)+( ρ)(1 − γ(s|e)) + (1 − ρ)] that the innovation is either failed or has been
sold to ﬁrm 2. In this case, ﬁrm 1 will receive a report n, resulting in the cost c1(n), and
have an expectation about ﬁrm 2’s cost Enc2.
As described, due to incomplete information, ﬁrm 1 cannot detect or counteract infor-
mation leakage in the interim stage. Firm 1 can only seek for an R&D contract that can
prevent information leakage exante. The deﬁnition is given as follows.
15Deﬁnition 2 In a leakage free contract, ﬁrm 1 max
C
Π1(e,C) subject to the IC and the
l e a k a g ef r e ec o n s t r a i n t s .
It is worthwhile to discuss whether it is without loss of generality to focus on a leakage
free contract. We now argue that there is no equilibrium allowing partial leakage. Notice
ﬁrst that the probability of partial leakage can be captured by I(L,s) by allowing 0 <
I(L,s) < 1. This indicates that the contractor is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting
ﬁrm 2’s oﬀer, but ﬁrm 2 can easily break the tie by slightly increasing L. Therefore, partial
leakage in our setting cannot happen in equilibrium.
Given the leakage free constraint, ﬁrm 2 cannot outbid in the interim stage and hence
I(L,s)=0 . R e p l a c et h i si n t oΠ0(e), and the IC becomes




To determine which constraints, IC or leakage free, will be binding, we need to consider
t h er e l a t i v es i z e so fπ2(c1(n),b c)−π2(c1(s),c) and
ψ(e)
ργ(s|e) as follows. Remind that the status
quo of ﬁrm 1 is π1(c,c).
(i) If π2(c1(n),b c)−π2(c1(s),c) >
ψ(e)
ργ(s|e), then the information leakage constraint should
be binding, that is,  (s) −  (n)=π2(c1(n),b c)− π2(c1(s),c). Since there is no further
restriction on  (n), the cheapest reward is to set  (n)=0 . Hence,  (s)=π2(c1(n),b c) −
π2(c1(s),c). However, when we replace  (n) and  (s) into Π1(e,C), ﬁrm 1’s expected
payoﬀ becomes
Π1(e,C)=π1(c,Enc2)+ργ(s|e)(1-I(L,s)){[π1(b c,Esc2)-π1(c,Enc2)]-[π2(c,b c)-π2(b c,c)]}.
By the symmetry among two ﬁrms, Remark 1 describes that π1(b c,Esc2) − π1(c,Enc2)] <
[π2(c,b c) − π2(b c,c)]. This implies that the second term of Π1(e,C) is negative. Hence,
together with the fact that π1(c,Enc2) <π 1(c,c), we can conclude that ﬁrm 1’s expected
payoﬀ with the leakage free constraint is worse than the status quo π1(c,c).
(ii) If π2(c1(n),b c)−π2(c1(s),c) <
ψ(e)
ργ(s|e), then the IC constraint should be binding, that
is,  (s)− (n)=
ψ(e)
ργ(s|e). Since there is no further restriction on  (n), the cheapest reward
16is to set  (n)=0 . Hence,  (s)=
ψ(e)
ργ(s|e). Since π2(c1(n),b c) − π2(c1(s),c) has caused an
expected payoﬀ less than π1(c,c), ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ must be worse as
ψ(e)
ργ(s|e) >π 2(c1(n),b c)-
π2(c1(s),c).
Overall, in both cases, ﬁrm 10s equilibrium payoﬀ is lower than the status quo π1(c,c),
and hence a proﬁtable leakage free contract does not exist.
Proposition 3 Ap r o ﬁtable leakage free contract does not exist.
In order to avoid information leakage, the incentive scheme needs to assign a suﬃciently
high reward to compete with the oﬀer that ﬁrm 2 can make. In the interim stage, ﬁrm 1
and ﬁrm 2 are actually engaged in a sort of price competition; Firm 2 has the motivation
to outbid ﬁrm 1’s reward to buy the innovation, while ﬁrm 1 has to reward high enough
so that ﬁrm 2 cannot outbid. The result is hence similar to that of price competition,
that is, one of the two ﬁrms will oﬀer its highest beneﬁt associated with the innovation,
and the ﬁrm with a greater beneﬁt will win. Since the possibility of information leakage
will change ﬁrm 1’s expectation about ﬁrm 2’s production cost, it turns out that ﬁrm 1’s
highest beneﬁt is less than ﬁrm 2 who has private information in the production game.
Hence there exists no proﬁtable leakage free contract.
Before providing our solution for this leakage problem, it is interesting to see if a
revenue-sharing scheme (see Lai, et. al., 2006) can work in this case. Our answer, how-
ever, is no. The reason is because the incentive for cheating remains the same as in
the ﬁxed revenue scheme. To see this, suppose  (s)=α(s)π1(c1(s),E sc2) and  (n)=
α(n)π1(c1(n),E sc2),w h e r eα(r) is the share of proﬁt for reporting r. Take the case of
π2(c1(n),b c)−π2(c1(s),c) >
ψ(e)
ργ(s|e) for example. The leakage free constraint should be bind-
i n gi nt h i sc a s e ,a n dh e n c ew eh a v eα(s)π1(c1(s),E sc2)-α(n)π1(c1(n),E sc2)=π2(c1(n),b c)−
π2(c1(s),c). Since there is no further restriction on α(n), the cheapest share is to set
α(n)=0 . Therefore, α(s)π1(c1(s),E sc2)= π2(c1(n),b c)- π2(c1(s),c). After replacing α(n)
and α(s) into Π1(e,C), w ew i l lh a v et h es a m er e s u l ta st h eﬁxed reward: ﬁrm 1’s expected
payoﬀ with the leakage free constraint is worse than the status quo π1(c,c).
17Next, it is useful to see if a disclosure punishment D can prevent the leakage. The
punishment is supposed to increase the contractor’s cost for cheating. That is, let λ denote
the probability that ﬁrm 1 is 100% certain that the contractor has sold the innovation. In
lawsuits, only convicted defendant will be ﬁned, and hence ﬁrm 1 needs to be 100% certain
that the innovation has been sold out by the contractor. Considering the punishment, the
contractor’s leakage decision can be rewritten as
to sell if (1 − λ)(L +  (n)) + λ(−D) ≥  (s).
If λ>0, the punishment can indeed increase the least oﬀer of L and decrease the possibility
of successful information leakage. However, in the single contractor case, ﬁrm 1 is not even
acknowledged the status of innovation, let alone to be sure about the secret deal. Therefore
λ =0and a disclosure punishment will not work in this case.
3H i r i n g T w o C o n t r a c t o r s
In the leakage free contract, extra rewards are given to the contractor, because he has
higher bargaining power by secretly selling the innovation. Now, if some competition is
introduced to the contractor side, then ﬁrm 1’s bargaining power can be increased and it will
not necessarily pay the contractor the highest possible reward. According to Holmstrom
(1982), "competition among agents with relative evaluation has merit as a device to extract
information optimally." In this section, we will demonstrate how hiring two contractors can
prevent information leakage and mitigate the over rewarding problem.
However, an immediate question with this setting is: Will two contractors increase the
possibility of successful information leakage? Our answer is: if there is a disclosure pun-
ishment D, then the probability of information leakage will actually decrease! Recall from
Section 2 that a disclosure punishment will not work in single contractor case, because ﬁrm
1i sn o te v e na c k n o w l e d g e dt h es t a t u so fi n n o v a t i o na n dh e n c ei tc a n n o tb e1 0 0 %c e r t a i n
that the contractor has sold the innovation. With two contractors, we will demonstrate
18that a disclosure punishment might work because there is more chance that the defector
can be identiﬁed and receive the punishment.
The Environment Let a and b denote the two independent contractors that ﬁrm
1 hires to work on R&D for a process innovation. As in Section 2, it is assumed that a
successful innovation will reduce the production cost from c to b c. The two contractors25
will be rewarded according to their relative performances (see Holmstrom, 1982). Let
(ra,r b), with rk ∈ {s,n} for k = a,b, denote the respective reports by contractor a and
b,a n d (ra,r b) denote the relative performance rewards which are summarized as Fig 2.
The interpretation is: if both contractors report successful innovations, both are equally








Figure 2: The relative performance scheme.
rewarded  M; if both report failures, both get z>0; if only one contractor reports a
successful innovation, he is to be paid  H(>  M) and the other is paid some service fee,
which is normalized to zero. All rewards will be determined in the model.
The eﬀort space for each contractor is assumed to be the same as in Section 2, i.e.,
Ek = E = {0,e} for k = a,b. Also, let the same γ(s|e) denote each contractor’s probability
of discovering a successful innovation and we assume that γ(s|0) = 0 and γ(s|e) > 0. The
eﬀort cost is given by ψ(e) a n dw ea s s u m et h a tψ(0) = 0 and ψ(0) <ψ (e).
Timing We will consider the following timing of game: (i) Firm 1 oﬀers a relative
performance scheme to contractors a and b. Then, both contractors choose their eﬀort
25To simplify, it is assumed that there is no other strategic interaction between the two contractors such
as collusion or frame-up.
19independently and simultaneously; (ii) After the eﬀort decisions and given the status of
innovation, each contractor decides whether to sell the innovation and change the content of
report accordingly ; (iii) After receiving the reports, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 play the production
game deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n2 .
3.1 Characterization of Equilibrium
We will solve the game backward the timing. Firstly, there can be four combinations of
reports, that is, (s,s), (s,n), (n,s), (n,n). Firm 1’s production cost will be b c for (s,s),
(s,n), and (n,s) and the cost will be c for (n,n).L e tσ(ra,r b) denote the probability that
ﬁrm 1 thinks that the innovation has been successful but the contractor has sold it to ﬁrm
2. The calculation is related to the status of innovation, the contractors’ leakage decisions,
and ﬁrm 2’s outbid decision, hence we will address the details shortly. Given this belief,
the equilibrium outputs under incomplete information are given by equation (1) and (2).
Leakage Decisions The contractors’ leakage decisions will depend on the other con-
tractor’s innovation status as well as his leakage decision. Here we have simpliﬁed the
analysis by assuming that the contractors know each other’s innovation results, probably
through private communications26.L e t(θa,θ b) denote the two contractors’ true status of
innovation. Similar to reports, there can be four combinations: (s,s), (s,n), (n,s), (n,n).
If the status is (n,n), selling the innovation is impossible for either contractor. If the status
is (s,n)o r( n,s), then the decision for the contractor who has s w i l lb et h es a m ea si n
Section 2, and ﬁrm 2 will outbid the reward up to the highest level of L. Hence, for the
above three states, according to our discussion in Section 2, successful information leakage
is possible and hence ﬁrm 1 can only receive (n,n) for these three cases. Finally, if the
status is (s,s), then there can be four decision combinations: both contractors sell, one
of two contractors sells, and none of the contractors sells. Figure 3 depicts the resulting
26See literature on spillover in R&D, e.g., Jaﬀe, (1986) and Perez-Castillo and Sandonis (1996).
20reports for diﬀerent combinations of leakage decisions, and we now discuss each case as
follows.
n s,





Figure 3: Four possible reprots for (θa,θ b)=( s,s).
(i) When both of the two contractors come forward to sell the innovation, ﬁrm 2 will
only buy one innovation, as one27 innovation is suﬃcient to reduce the production cost to b c.
Buying two innovations28 will not further reduce the production cost and it will cost more.
We will assume that form 2 will select the contractor to purchase randomly. Given that
ﬁrm 2 will only buy one innovation, the report combination (n,n) is not possible for status
(s,s). (ii) When only one contractor sells the innovation, ﬁrm 2 will behave as addressed
i nS e c t i o n2a n do u t b i du pt oL. In this case, the report will be (s,n). (iii) When none of
the contractors sells the innovation, the reports will be (s,s).
In sum, the following lemma concludes the connection between reports, the true states
of innovation, and the contractors’ leakage decisions.
Lemma 4 If the reports are (s,s), then the status must be (s,s) and none of the contrac-
tors has sold the innovation; If the reports are (s,n)o r( n,s), then the status is (s,s)a n d
one contractor has sold the innovation to ﬁrm 2; If the reports are (n,n), then the status
can be (n,n), (n,s)o r( s,n).
27We assume that two contractors’ innovations are of the same quality.
28Buying one innovation is a dominant strategy for ﬁrm 2, given the fact that two oﬀers have been
given. There can be another equilibrium where ﬁrm 2 buy two innovations and both contractors sell their
innovations. In this case, the result is the same as in Section 2, i.e., information leakage is inevitable.
21Using Lemma 4, we can calculate ﬁrm 1’s posterior belief σ(ra,r b) as follows. First
notice that the reports (s,n)o r( n,s)c a n n o tc o m ef r o mt h es t a t u s( s,n)o r( n,s), because
the contractor with the innovation will sell it to ﬁrm 2. Moreover, the reports (n,n)c a n
come from status (n,n), (n,s)a n d( s,n). Together with the leakage decisions in Lemma
4, it can be easily calculated that (i) σ(s,s)=0 , that is, if two contractors report s,
then ﬁrm 1 is certain that both of them have put in eﬀort and have not cheated; (ii)
σ(n,n)=
2ργ(s|e)(1−γ(s|e))
ρ[2γ(s|e)(1−γ(s|e))+(1−γ(s|e))2]+(1−ρ) by applying the Bayes’ rule. The interpretation
is similar to σ(n) in equation (4); (iii) σ(s,n)=1and σ(n,s)=1 . The reason is because
if only one contractor reports s, then according to our discussion above, ﬁrm 1 is certain29
that both of them have put in eﬀort and the contractor reporting n has cheated.
Given ﬁrm 1’s posterior belief, we can now determine the equilibrium for leakage deci-
sions in Figure 3 for (θa,θ b)=( s,s). Recall that we have a pecuniary punishment D for a
convicted theft, and the relative performance rewards are given in Figure 2. The payoﬀs
f o re a c hd e c i s i o np r o ﬁle are given as follows. (i) As explained above, it is not possible that
both contractors30 can sell the innovation. To express the impossibility, we can assume a
negative reward for each contractor, say, −ε for ε>0. It can be checked that the level of ε
will not aﬀect the equilibrium; (ii) If both do not sell, then the report will be (s,s) and the
rewards are  M for both contractors; (iii) If only one of them sells the innovation, then the
reports will be (s,n)o r( n,s)a n dt h er e w a r d sw i l lb e( H,0) and (0,  H), respectively.
Moreover, for the contractor who chooses to sell the innovation, there is an oﬀer L = z from
ﬁrm 2 according to a decision rule similar to equation (5). But in this case, ﬁrm 1 can be
certain31 that the contractor reporting n has committed theft, which allows ﬁrm 1 to ask
for damage liability32 or punishment D from the contractor reporting n. Hence, the total
29In fact, we will show that both (s,n)o r( n,s) cannot be equilibrium. But since our beliefs are derived
by the Bayes’ rule, the consistency requirement by Kreps and Wilson (1982) is satisﬁed.
30Remind that since report (n,n) is not possible for (θa,θb)=( s,s), the reward is not z for each
contractor.
31As explained, this is because reports (s,n) or (n,s) cannot come from status (s,n) or (n,s).
32Here, we assume perfect enforcement on this punishment. See Qiu (2006) for discussion on diﬀerent
22beneﬁt for the decision proﬁles (sell,not)a n d( not,sell)a r e(z−D, H) and ( H,z−D),
respectively. According to Section 1832 of the Economic Espionage Act 1996, this ﬁne can
be up to 10 years and ﬁned $500,000 or both. The point is: if D is suﬃciently big, then
there will exist a unique equilibrium where both contractors do not sell the innovation in
the case of (θa,θ b)=( s,s).
To sum up, if the status is (θa,θ b)=( n,n), then none of the contractors can sell
the innovation; if (θa,θ b)= (s,n)o r( n,s), then the contractor who has s will sell; if
(θa,θ b)=( s,s), then there will be an equilibrium where both agents do not sell, if D is
suﬃciently big.
Optimal Relative Performance Scheme Given the contractors leakage decisions
above, we can derive the optimal rewards as follows. First of all, the IC constraints are
required for eﬀort putting. That is, let b Πk(e) denote contractor k’s expected payoﬀ,w h e r e
b Πk(e)=ρ{γ(s|e)
2 
M + γ(s|e)(1 − γ(s|e))( 
H)}
+{ρ(1 − γ(s|e))
2 +( 1− ρ)}z − ψ(e).
Given the prior belief ρ, the chance for both contractors to discover successful innovations
is γ(e|s)2. In this case, both contractors will choose not to sell and hence both receive  M.
The chance that only contractor k discovers the innovation is γ(s|e)(1 − γ(s|e)), in which
case, as discussed, he will sell the information and get a reward for reporting n as the other
contractor. The reward will be z plus the oﬀer L from ﬁrm 2. According to equation (5) in
Section 2, L is determined by z+L =  H. Replacing L =  H −z into the reward, the sum
of rewards for this case is  H. Finally, there is an overall probability {ρ(1−γ(s|e))2+(1−ρ)}
that neither of the two contractors will discover successful innovation, and hence the reward
is z.N o t i c et h a tb Πk(0) = z.
To motivate the contractors to put in eﬀort, it is required by the IC constraint that
b Πk(e) ≥ z,
degrees of court enforcement.
23which can be simpliﬁed as:
γ(s|e) 
M +( 1− γ(s|e))( 




Since b Πk(0) = z, it would be the cheapest33 to set z =0 . Therefore, the cheapest reward
to satisfy the IC is to set γ(s|e) M +(1−γ(s|e))( H)=
ψ(e)
ρ{γ(s|e). It can be calculated that
the total reward that ﬁrm 1 needs to pay is
ρ{γ(s|e)
22 
M +2 γ(s|e)(1 − γ(s|e))( 
H)} + {ρ(1 − γ(s|e))
2 +( 1− ρ)}2z.
Substitute z =0and this total reward becomes 2ψ(e).
In other words, if the eﬀort cost ψ(e) is not too high, the overall reward that ﬁrm 1 pays
for hiring two contractors will be relatively lower than hiring one contractor. Moreover,
unlike the single contractor case where the innovation is always leaked, there is a probability
ργ(s|e)2 that there is no information leakage.
In sum, in a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this contracting process, ﬁrm 1 deter-
mines the cheapest relative performance rewards to satisfy γ(s|e) M +(1−γ(s|e))( H)=
ψ(e)
ρ{γ(s|e), the contractors’ leakage decisions and ﬁrm 1’s posterior beliefs are described above,
and given the posterior beliefs, each ﬁrm’s proﬁts are given by equation (1) and (2). The
following proposition summarizes the comparison to the single contractor case.
Proposition 5 When hiring two contractors, there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equi-
librium where the probability of successful information leakage is less and the equilibrium
reward is cheaper than hiring one contractor.
Proof. (i) Notice that in the single contractor case, there exist no leakage free contract,
and hence the probability of successful information leakage is 1. This is higher than the
probability of leakage for hiring two contractors: 1−ργ(s|e)2. (ii) The total reward in this
equilibrium is 2ψ(e), and this is smaller than hiring one contractor where the reward is
higher than ﬁrm 1’s total beneﬁt from innovation.
33Otherwise, ﬁrm 1 can increase total payoﬀ by lowering z.
24Finally, it is interesting to see how information leakage will aﬀect ﬁrm 1’s revenue. Firm
1’s expected revenue in this equilibrium is: ρ{γ(s|e)2π1(b c,c)+ 2γ(s|e)(1 − γ(s|e))π1(b c,b c)}
+{ρ(1−γ(s|e))2+ (1−ρ)}π1(c,E(n,n)c2). This is less than the case where two contractors are
honest: ρ{γ(s|e)2π1(b c,c)+ 2γ(s|e)(1-γ(s|e))π1(b c,c)}+ {ρ(1−γ(s|e))2+ (1−ρ)}π1(c,c). The
possibility of information leakage reduces the expected revenue because (i) ﬁrm 1 loses its
cost advantage from innovation in status (s,n)a n d( n,s) and this is because the successful
contractor will betray; (ii) ﬁrm 1 loses part of its cost advantage in status (n,n) because
its suspicion that one of the contractors might have cheated reduces ﬁrm 1’s expectation
on ﬁrm 2’s production cost.
Overall, hiring two contractors might work because under the relative performance
scheme, the contractors’ bargaining power has been decreased, and moreover, there is
more chance that the cheating behavior can be detected, which leaves the space for the
disclosure punishment to help with the leakage problem.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Outsourcing R&D activities has become an inevitable trend in this era of outsourcing. Due
to its uncertain features, R&D outsourcing is encountered with a high risk of information
leakage. This paper pointed out how the possibility of information leakage can push up the
contract reward that causes the non-existence of a leakage free contract. Also, we demon-
strated how a competitive mechanism of hiring two contractors, together with a disclosure
punishment, can result in a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the possibility of
successful leakage is reduced and the equilibrium reward is also cheaper.
Throughout the paper, we have made several simpliﬁcations to emphasize the impacts
of information leakage, and relaxing these assumptions can certainly enrich the analysis
and we hope to leave for further research. For example, we have assumed only a single
R&D ﬁrm and considered only the deliberate information leakage. It would be interesting to
25explore the case with multiple R&D ﬁrms with one or two contractors, where the discussion
from the common agency literature (see Martimort, 2006) can help to address more issues
related to information leakage.
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